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IMMUTABILITY OF IDENTITY, TITLE VII, AND
THE ADA AMENDMENT ACT: HOW BEING
"REGARDED AS" TRANSGENDER COULD
AFFECT EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
INTRODUCTION
Transgender and gender-queer individuals, especially those of
color, are at-risk of being victims of employment discrimination,
homelessness, violence, rape, police brutality, and incarcera-
tion., The transgender and gender-queer rights movement has
also faced an uphill battle, with opposition coming from not only
the mainstream, traditional, and conservative sectors of society,
but within the broader LGBT community itself. Larger, main-
stream LGBT organizations have been criticized for only ad-
vancing agendas in the interest of an essentialized "Gay
Identity" that places an emphasis on policies and legislation that
benefit a small portion of the LGBT community, mainly those
who are white, male, and affluent.2 Many critical race theorists
have argued against polarizing notions of essentialist "Gay Iden-
tity." They assert that it fails to take into account the complex
needs of individuals who fall into multiple legal categories. An-
gela Harris describes "essentialism" as the notion that identity
can be described in isolated, universal terms; for example, defin-
ing an individual's identity as a "woman" as discrete from her
race, class, and sexual orientation.3 In opposition to this notion
that a single aspect of an individual's identity can be abstracted
from the whole, Kimberle Crenshaw's concept of "intersection-
ality" seeks to examine social and legal inequality created by an
individual's multiple, overlapping, and interacting identities,
I The National Transgender Discrimination Survey Report, available at http://
endtransdiscrimination.org/report.html (last visited December 2, 2013).
2 Darren Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual Iden-
tity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1360 (1999).
3 Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581, 585 (1990).
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such as race, gender, sexuality, class, and ability.4 Because of
their general emphasis on essentialist notions of identity, poli-
cies advanced by the broader LGBT rights movement that are
meant to solve problems faced by transgender or queer individ-
uals often do not take into account the diversity among trans-
gender and queer individuals, including how their needs are
affected by their race, religion, and class status.
Ideas of essentialized identity and assimilation within
women's rights movements and racial rights movements have
made their way into constitutional equal protection and federal
employment discrimination law.5 The reliance upon an immuta-
ble essentialized identity in equal protection jurisprudence 6 and
Title VII employment discrimination have protected some inter-
ests on the basis of race, gender, and sexual orientation, but
4 Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins Intersectionality, Identity Polit-
ics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STANFORD L. REV. 1241
(1991).
5 Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 1361. See also, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding "transgender" is not protected as a
status under Title VII).
6 The Supreme Court began to fully adopt the concept of immutable classifi-
cations as worthy of protection in the post-Lochner era equal protection
cases. Most notably, footnote 4 of U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144
(1938) discussed a possible concern with Court protection of "discrete and
insular minorities." For a more complete discussion of immutability in anti-
discrimination and equal protection jurisprudence, see generally Marc R. Sha-
piro, Treading the Supreme Court's Murky Immutability Waters, 38 GON. L.
REV. 409 (2002) (available at http://gonzagalawreview.org/files/2011/02/Sha-
piro.pdf). Immutability as a judicial doctrine can work as a barrier to protec-
tion for sexual minorities where conduct is separated out from the status of
the individual, often resulting in inconsistent results in terms of prohibiting
discrimination. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state law criminalizing sod-
omy, in part, because the Court found no fundamental right for homosexuals
to engage in the act of sodomy. In contrast, in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996), the Court struck down a state constitutional amendment that would
prohibit any ordinances that create protections on the basis of homosexual,
lesbian, or bisexual status. For a more complete discussion of the status/con-
duct distinction and the problem of immutability in equal protection jurispru-
dence, see Francisco Valdes, The Status/Conduct Distinction and Sexual
Orientation: Exploring a Constitutional Conundrum, 50 Guild Prac. 65 (1993).
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have denied benefits to the trans population.7 "Transgender"
identity is a concept that is fluid and not easily categorized,
which may contribute to transgender exclusion from anti-dis-
crimination protections.
In contrast, the disability rights movement rejects the idea
that the identity of disability lies within the individual, and in-
stead defines "disability" as the end result of discriminatory
forces that deny social access to individuals.8 Many disability
rights legal scholars have argued that the law should force soci-
ety to deconstruct and change its own discriminatory practices
to accommodate impaired individuals, as opposed to the individ-
ual being forced to "cure" her disability to gain access, ulti-
mately allowing society to stay the same.9 As a result of the
work of disability rights activists, the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (the ADA) allows claims of disparate treatment and im-
pact to be made by those who are "regarded as" having an
impairment, whether or not they actually have such an impair-
ment.10 By re-orienting concepts of "identity" from immutable
characteristics inherent in an individual to the perceived charac-
teristics of the individual by discriminatory actors, the "regarded
as" portion of the ADA provides a flexible legal scheme for
making employment discrimination claims.
Although the ADA may provide a better model than Title
VII for transgendered people seeking to gain protection against
employment discrimination due to its more fluid definition of
identity, I argue that the disability model is still inadequate for
the transgender community because their most likely coverage
under the "regarded as" prong of disability would only allow for
7 Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d at 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that "the
words of Title VII do not outlaw discrimination against a person who has a
sexual identity disorder"). See also Sommers v. Budget Marketing, 667 F.2d
748 (8th Cir. 1982), Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th
Cir. 1977). But see Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008);
8 Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What's Disability Studies Got to Do With It or
An Introduction to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUm. Hum. RTS. L. REV.
403, 407 (2011).
9 Id. at 420-21.
10 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2011).
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disparate treatment claims under the recently enacted ADA
Amendments Act of 2008. As such, allowing transgender plain-
tiffs to bring "regarded as" claims under the ADA would merely
allow them to prevail upon the same types of claims that are
already currently emerging for transgender plaintiffs under Title
VII.
Part I of the article discusses the debate on transgender iden-
tity, comparing conceptions of "transgender identity" within the
transgender community, the medical model of transgender iden-
tity, and disabled identity under the social model of disability.
Part II of the article discusses the current state of the law under
the ADA and Title VII, highlighting possible legal avenues
where transgender individuals may be included under existing
employment discrimination statutes. Part III explains what
transgender inclusion under the ADA's "regarded as" prong of
disability may look like in practice, and why it is a viable avenue
to extend more protections to transgender plaintiffs.
I. WHO TO PROTECT As "TRANSGENDER": THE DEBATE
OVER IDENTITY, THE MEDICAL MODEL, AND THE
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT
"Transgender" is an umbrella term covering those who feel or
express gender identity contrary to the sex they were assigned at
birth." Transsexuals, cross-dressers, and other individuals who
express some sort of gender non-conformity would all be consid-
ered transgender.12 Transsexuals are most commonly defined as
those who seek medical intervention, as they "desire to live and
be accepted as a member of the opposite sex ... and ... wish to
have surgery and hormonal treatment to make [their bodies] as
congruent as possible with [their] preferred sex."13 Other indi-
viduals who are defined as or identify themselves as gender-non-
11 GLAAD Media Reference Guide, http://www.glaad.org/reference/trans-
gender (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).
12 Id.
13 Transsexualism, International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Re-
lated Health Problems, World Health Organization, http://apps.who.int/classi-
fications/apps/icd/icdlOonline/ (last visited Oct. 29. 2012).
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conforming may not seek medical intervention, and many per-
ceive of their gender identity as something fluid or flexible
outside of the traditional male/female gender binary.14 Some
who conceive their gender identity and expression as existing
outside of the gender binary self-identify as genderqueer.15
Of course, even these terms are by no means exhaustive. Ac-
tivists, bloggers, and scholars within the transgender community
often disagree about how to categorize "trans identity." Certain
activists use the signifier "trans*" to differentiate from the more
binary concepts of "trans woman" and "trans man," using trans*
to indicate all non-cisgender identities, including genderqueer,
genderfluid, non-binary, agendered, non-gendered, third
gendered, two spirit, etc. 16 Though many transgender individuals
identify as "MTF" (male-to-female) or "FTM" (female-to-
male), others consider such terms inaccurate because they be-
lieve "trans identity is not a linear path from one category to
another."17
It is because of a defiance of traditional categorization that
many transgender individuals have had problems successfully
arguing for benefits under the law. Many successes gained by
lesbians, gays, and bisexuals have been gained by taking on
"sexual orientation" as an immutable identity or status.1 8 As
discussed previously, many transgender individuals reject the
14 See Jason Cromwell, Transmen & FTMs: Identities, Bodies, Genders &
Sexualities, 22 ( Univ. of Ill. Presl999).
15 See Raven Usher, North American Lexicon of Transgender Terms (2006).
16 Sam Killerman, What does the asterisk in trans* stand for?, It's Pro-
nounced Metrosexual at http://itspronouncedmetrosexual.com/2012/05/what-
does-the-asterisk-in-trans-stand-for/ ("Cis" individuals are those whose gen-
der identity aligns with their sex assigned at birth).
17 Madison Lyn Glyttr, Two Things to Remember when Discussing Transmis-
ogyny, (Aug. 4, 2011) at http://vwyllyss.wordpress.com/2011/08/04/two-things-
to-remember-when-discussing-transmisogyny/.
18 Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Dis-
crimination Law, 52 William & Mary Law Review 1483 (2011); Letter of At-
torney General to Speaker of the House (finding the Defense of Marriage
Act unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because sexual orientation
is a suspect class with a immutable characteristics), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).
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notion of defining themselves as either male or female, even as
"trans man" or "trans woman," and instead conceive of gender
identity and expression as a complex and ever-changing con-
cept.19 Because this perception of gender is fluid, it rejects tak-
ing on an essentialized identity necessary to gain a marginalized
"status" worthy of legal protection. Dean Spade, a prominent
transgender activist, has noted that it is painful for him, as a
transgender activist, to seek benefits by categorizing himself by
a "pretended belief in a binary gender system that [he has] been
working to dismantle since adolescence." 2 0 Many transgender
individuals move in and out of different categories of feminine
and masculine expression over the course of their lives, and
many do not try to "pass" as one sex or the other.21 Because of
this fluidity of identity, it is difficult to find a legal standard that
adequately protects and accurately reflects the rights and exper-
iences of trans* individuals.
One complication in establishing protection for trans* individ-
uals under anti-discrimination legal doctrines is entrenchment
within the medical establishment. Many transgender individuals
seek medical intervention in the form of gender-affirming sur-
gery and hormone treatments. While sexual orientation is no
longer listed as a recognized mental illness in the DSM-IV, Gen-
der Identity Disorder (hereinafter 'GID') is listed as a mental
disorder.22 Many transgendered activists wish to go the route
gay, lesbian, and bisexual activists took before them to
depathologize transgenderism as a recognized disorder.23 Activ-
ists in favor of demedicalization feel that medicalization and re-
quirement of a diagnosis only reinforces normative heterosexual
concepts of gender identity, whereas queerness and gender-non-
normative expression should celebrate the diversity and vari-
19 Cromwell, supra note 55, at 4.
20 Spade, supra note 26, at 22.
21 Id. at 27.
22 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4 th ed.).
23 In Her Own Image: Transgender Activist Pauline Park, TheGully.com,
http://www.thegully.com/essays/gaymundo/020702_transgender-p-park.html.
(last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
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ance of gender identity.24 These transgender activists seek to
liberate transgender individuals from medicalized legal concep-
tions and argue from a sex discrimination standpoint that these
methods of gaining legal protections and benefits are arguably
less successful in obtaining protection.25 However, this is prob-
lematic when transgender individuals are faced with the issue of
procuring hormone therapy and surgery. Since many trans-
gendered individuals continue to seek medical treatment, some
transgender activists have questioned whether it is the law's role
to remove transgender issues from the medical establishment.26
In order to receive gender-affirming medical treatment, most
transgender individuals need to go through a process of gaining
a diagnosis, going through therapy, and finally getting the rec-
ommendation required to receive hormones and surgery.27 This
process requires them to take on a diagnosis that creates an
identity as a "transsexual with GID."28 As Anna Kirkland
noted of the connection between transgender rights and the
medical system, "lawsuits are only successful insofar as petition-
ers characterize themselves in need of a clear surgical gender
assignment . . ."29 This medical model of transgender identity is
similar to the medical model of disability that requires diagnosis
with an illness or impairment in need of "treatment, rehabilita-
tion, a cure, or charity" in order for the individual to be consid-
ered as "disabled" for the purposes of legal claims.30
Transgender-activists have noted that disability law is an avenue
for gaining medical benefits for transgender clients.31
24 Id.
25 Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 58 HASTINGs L.J. 731, 736 (2008).
26 Spade, supra note 26, at 33.
27 See Deborah Rudacille, The Riddle of Gender 195 (2005).
28 Cromwell, supra note 55, at 19-20.
29 Anna Kirkland, Victorious Transsexuals in the Courtroom: A Challenge
for Feminist Legal Theory, 28 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 7 (2003).
30 Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What's Disability Studies Got to Do With It or
An Introduction to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUm. Hum. RTS. L. REV.
403, 419 (2011).
31 Spade, supra note 26, at 33.
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Jennifer Levi argues in favor of the legal medical model of
disability when seeking medical treatment for transgender indi-
viduals. Discussing different outcomes of cases where transsex-
ual plaintiffs with diagnosed GID prevailed, she noted that
these cases included extensive discussion of the inelasticity of
gender identity as a facet of disability. 32 She argues that the
medical model of disability explains transgender identities to
hostile courts in a way that sex and gender-centric discourse
does not. She writes, "[a disability claim] humanizes the plain-
tiff . .. [and] gives a court a construct for understanding why
someone cannot conform to a gender stereotype and does so in
language the judge can understand." 33
However, accepting a medical model of transgender identity
comes with a number of problems. Firstly, there is the problem
of access to diagnosis with GID, which can be a lengthy, expen-
sive process outside of the means of many transgender individu-
als, particularly those of color within lower socioeconomic
classes.34 Even with the diagnosis of GID, transgender individu-
als still face difficulty obtaining access to hormone treatment
and sex reassignment surgery.35 Under the medical model of
transgender identity, without a clear diagnosis of GID, it is in-
credibly difficult for legal claims to prevail.36 Legal protection
designed to protect on the basis of "transgender identity" there-
fore remains inaccessible to those trans* individuals who do not
have the means to obtain a diagnosis.
A second consideration is that the medical model of trans-
gender identity allows the courts to intrusively consider the
32 Jennifer Levi, Clothes Don't Make the Man (Or Woman), But Gender
Identity Might, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90, 101 (2006).
33 Id. at 104.
34 Spade, supra note 26, at 33.
35 APA Position Statement on Access to Care for Transgender and Gender




36 See Enriquez v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 377 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001), dismissing a claim where plaintiffs diagnosis with GID was
not established through clear, established, medical standards.
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medical histories of trans* individuals in determining whether
they are worthy of legal protection. The medical model of trans-
gender identity opens the door to allow courts to ask how much
medical intervention is required before an individual is consid-
ered "transgender," and thereby worthy of protection. Is the
mere diagnosis of GID enough, or would the individual also
have to undergo hormone treatments? Would any sex-reassign-
ment surgery (such as a trachea shave or breast augmentation)
render that individual "transgender," or would nothing less than
full genital reassignment surgery allow the courts to protect on
the basis of transgender identity? When a medical model of
transgender identity is used as a vehicle for determining which
individuals should receive legal protection, courts and legisla-
tures traditionally only give protection to those trans* individu-
als who are "transsexuals with GID" and have had full genital-
reassignment surgery.37 This becomes particularly problematic
because not all trans* individuals seek surgery. For example, 20
percent of transgender women do not want vaginoplasty or an
orchiectomy, and 72 percent of transgender men do not want
phalloplasty.38
A third, and perhaps the most problematic, concern created
by the medical model of transgender identity is that it is an in-
credibly exclusive category encompassing a significant, but rela-
tively small portion of the transgender community. Dean Spade
37 For example, in Illinois, an affidavit from a physician is required certifying
a sex-reassignment operation was performed before the gender marker on a
birth certificate may be changed. 410 Ill. Comp. Stat. 535/17(d). The Depart-
ment of Vital Records in Illinois has long had a standing policy of issuing new
birth certificates only in cases where the certifying physician was licensed in
the United States. See ACLU Challenges Unconstitutional Illinois Require-
ments for Correcting Transgender Birth Certificates, at http://www.aclu.org/
lgbt-rights/aclu-challenges-unconstitutional-illinois-requirements-correcting-
transgender-birth-cert. See also, In re Marriage of Simmons, 355 Ill. App. 3d
942 (1st Dist. 2005), terminating parental rights of transsexual father because
he had not had full genital reassignment surgery, was therefore never legally
married to his ex-wife, and could have no legal rights to their child.
38 National Transgender Discrimination Survey, Report on Health and
Health Care, 11-12 (2010) at http://transequality.org/PDFs/NTDSReporton
Health-final.pdf. Vaginoplasty fashions a vaginal canal, while an orchiectomy
removes the testes. Phalloplasty constructs a penis.
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argues that the necessity for diagnosis as a transsexual requires
conforming with a heteronormative view of masculinity and
femininity, where to be a "real" transsexual male is to want to
pass as a man all the time.39 This concept of "real transsexual-
ity" creates an incredibly narrow category; a category that be-
comes even more problematic because it is defined by the out-
group of medical practitioners who do not themselves identify as
trans or gender-non-conforming. 40 The DSM-IV describes GID
without reference to sex-changing medical treatment or hor-
mone therapy.4' In practice, however, a diagnosis of GID will
not be given in situations where an individual does not establish
they are a transsexual who seeks to medically alter their body
and consistently live in social scenarios as a member of the op-
posite sex.4 2 As a result, when gender non-normative individu-
als who are not clearly diagnosable as "transsexuals with GID"
seek medical treatment, they are often incapable of gaining the
gender-affirming medical treatment they desire. 43 Consider a
scenario in which a person who expresses gender as a man but
has the biological sex of a woman is fired because of his gender
non-conformity. In order to make a claim on the basis of the
medical model of transgender identity, he would have to gain a
diagnosis of GID, which may be difficult to obtain if he does not
seek to alter his biological sex through hormone treatment or
surgery. If the courts accepted the medical model of trans-
39 Spade, supra note 26, at 21.
40 Id. at 26.
41 The DSM-IV lays out four criteria for diagnosis with GID:
1. Long-standing and strong identification with another gender.
2. Long-standing disquiet about the sex assigned or a sense of incongruity
in the gender-assigned role of that sex.
3. The diagnosis is not made if the individual also has physical intersex
characteristics.
4. Significant clinical discomfort or impairment at work, social situations,
or other important life areas.
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition, Text
Revised.
42 Spade, supra note 26, at 19.
43 Id. at 21-22.
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gender identity, this person would be left with no legal recourse
for the discrimination he faced.
Scholars in the disability rights movement would likewise dis-
agree with buying into the medical model of disability, regard-
less of whether individuals may succeed in bringing claims under
this model, because it "personalizes disability, casting it as a def-
icit located within individuals that requires rehabilitation to cor-
rect."44 The disability rights movement includes certain fluid
concepts of identity that are useful to the more fluid identity
schema forwarded by many transgender activists. The disability
rights movement (not to be confused with currently existing dis-
ability anti-discrimination statutes or jurisprudence) argues for
legal protection from a socially constructed accommodation-cre-
ating standpoint that allows for mutability of identities worthy
of protection.45 The driving theory behind this scheme is that
disabled individuals have the ability to participate fully in soci-
ety.4 6 But for artificial barriers created by certain social schemes
and stigmas, these individuals would not truly be "disabled" in
the sense that they cannot fully participate in the same way as
individuals who do not have a disability.47
Disability legal studies reject the idea that disability is "an in-
herent, immutable trait located in the person."48 It reframes the
concept of disability as a social phenomenon, defining the iden-
tity "disabled" subjectively.49 "Disabled" is reoriented as "a set
of relations that determines a person's place in society."50 The
minority group model of disability legal studies in particular fo-
cuses more on the relationship between the marginalized group
44 Paul K. Longmore & Lauri Umansky, Introduction in The New Disability
History: American Perspectives, 7 (Paul K. Longmore & Lauri Umansky eds.,
2001).
45 Elizabeth Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839,
876-878 (2008).
46 Abigail Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are Transgendered People Strangers
to the Law?, 20 BERKELY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 150, 188 (2005).
47 Id.
48 Kanter, supra note 71, at 407.
49 Id. at 408-09.
50 Id. at 416.
2014] IMMUTABILITY OF IDENTITY 73
of disabled individuals and other groups.51 The social model of
disability is seen by some disability scholars as an expansion on
the minority group model and conceives of disability as a rela-
tionship between individuals and a discriminatory society. 5 2
Disability level may change throughout an individual's life,
and many individuals in the disability rights movement do not
see a "disability" as part of their permanent identity.53 Rather,
they conceive of themselves as merely having "different" abili-
ties from others, and that these different abilities still have social
value in terms of contribution. 54 The disability rights movement
seeks to prevent arbitrary discrimination by removing the artifi-
cial social barriers that create it.5 It sees "difference" as being
something created in social relationships, and argues that disa-
bility is a natural part of the human condition instead of a defect
to be cured.56 By forcing society to accommodate all people,
regardless of how "different" they may be or may be perceived,
the disability rights movement seeks to foster the full societal
inclusion of all individuals57
Many transgendered individuals do not wish to seek benefits
under a disability law scheme, as they do not see themselves as
being "disabled."58 The stigma attached to disability is some-
thing many transgendered individuals find offensive. 59 How-
ever, as Dean Spade notes, this is an ableist stereotype at
work.60 Many transgender activists are actually in line with the
disability rights movement in fighting entrenched societal no-
tions of "normal"; how people should participate in society and
51 Id. at 427.
52 Tom Shakespeare, Disability, Identity and Difference in Exploring the Di-
vide, 94, 102 (Colin Barnes & Geof Mercer eds., 1996), available at http://
www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/Shakespeare/Chap6.pdf.
53 Emens, supra note 59, at 876.
54 Mark C. Weber, Understanding Disability Law, Second Ed., 2 (2012).
55 Kanter, supra note 71, at 409-410.
56 Weber, supra note 95, at 10.
57 Id.
58 Lloyd, supra note 87, at 187.
59 Id.
60 Spade, supra note 26, at 34.
[Vol. 3:1DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GENDER & L.74
2014] IMMUTABILITY OF ID ENTITY 75
how bodies should function or appear.61 Transgender activists
can therefore work together with disability rights activists to ar-
gue against a restrictive medical model of disability and trans-
gender identity, and work towards acceptance of a social model
of disability and transgender identity under the law.
II. COMPARING CATEGORIES OF IDENTITY IN THE CURRENT
LAW: BRINGING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS UNDER ADA AND TITLE VII
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides protec-
tion from discrimination for those who can prove they have a
"disability." 62 Title I of the ADA prohibits employment dis-
crimination on the basis of a disability.63 Unlike Title VII and
similar anti-discrimination statutes, the ADA only prohibits dis-
crimination against "disabled individuals" as opposed to "all in-
dividuals on the basis of race."M This system is asymmetric in
that only the defined group of marginalized, disabled individuals
can make claims, as opposed to other legal models where unfair
treatment regardless of an individual's group-status creates a
cause of action.65 The ADA requires accommodations to be
made, and the people or businesses that are forced to make ac-
commodating changes cannot claim they are discriminated
against in being forced to make accommodation. 66 This asym-
metric model may avoid some of the pitfalls of equal protection
jurisprudence that has been criticized for backfiring by under-
mining policies designed to correct social inequalities faced by
racial minorities, such as affirmative action.67
61 Id. at 33.
62 Id.
63 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2011).
64 Mark C. Weber, Understanding Disability Law, 13 (2d ed. 2012)
65 Elizabeth Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 839,
876-878 (2008).
66 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
67 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative
Action Cases, 100 HARv. L. REv. 78 (1987).
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In order to bring a claim under Title I of the ADA, a plaintiff
must first establish that she has a "disability" as defined by the
statute.68 The ADA defines a "disability" as 1) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities, 2) a record of such an impairment, or 3) being
regarded as having such an impairment.69 When it was first en-
acted, the definition of "disability" under the ADA was vague,
and as a result it was read strictly by courts so that many individ-
uals, including those with AIDS, cancer, and bipolar disorder,
were not considered covered by the ADA as individuals with
disabilities. 70 Subsequently, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
broadened the definition of "disability" by, among other things,
dramatically changing the "regarded as" prong.71 The ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 clarified the definition of the "re-
garded as" prong to be:
An individual meets the requirement of being re-
garded as having such an impairment if the indi-
vidual establishes that he or she has been
subjected to an action prohibited under this Act
because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment whether or not the impairment
limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.72
Described as such, the category of disability covering those who
are "regarded as" having an impairment does not require the
plaintiff to show an actual or perceived substantially limited ma-
jor life activity.73 If a plaintiff can establish that an employer
perceived them to have an impairment, and that the adverse ac-
68 See Hoffman v. Caterpillar, 256 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2001).
69 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2011).
70 See e.g. Blanks v. Sw. Bell Commc'ns Inc., 310 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002)
(HIV-positive status); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir.
1996) (breast cancer); Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350
(N.D.N.Y. 2000) (bipolar disorder).
71 See Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Dis-
abilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 Nw. U. L.
REV: Colloquy 217 (2008), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/law
review/Colloquy/2008/44/LRColl2008n44Long.pdf.
72 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).
73 Weber, supra note 13, at 39.
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tion was motivated by that perception, then they have satisfied
the "regarded as" prong of disability.74 This allows for a
broader category of disability than would be allowed under the
"actual impairment" or "past impairment" portions of the Act.7 5
The ADA explicitly prohibits individuals from making claims
on the basis of transsexualism or gender identity disorder.76 Be-
cause of this, some transgender activists bring anti-discrimina-
tion claims on behalf of transgender clients under Title VII's sex
discrimination clause instead.77 In many cases, the same argu-
ments used to fight against sexual orientation and sex discrimi-
nation have not worked for transgender individuals, and many
courts have found that transgender individuals are not protected
by Title VII on the basis of sex or gender discrimination.78
However, some more recent decisions are beginning to recog-
nize discrimination against transgender individuals as a form of
sex discrimination under Title VII.79
Jason Lee identifies three approaches to claiming protection
for transgender individuals under Title VII.80 Only the first two
approaches he describes have been used by courts to prohibit
employment discrimination against transgender plaintiffs under
Title VII. Lee calls the first approach the Gender Nonconform-
ity Approach, which argues that employment discrimination
cases dealing with transgender individuals should be treated like
sex-stereotyping claims, making the transgender identity of the
plaintiff a neutral element.81 Under this approach, the gender
74 Long, supra note 20, at 224.
75 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
76 42 USC §12211(b)(1) (2011).
77 Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 32 (2003).
78 See e.g. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d at 1086 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v.
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977).
79 See Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 304 (Dist. DC 2008); Smith v. City of
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2004).
80 Jason Lee, Lost In Transition: The Challenges of Remedying Transgender
Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 423,
435 (2012).
81 Id. at 435.
2014] IMMUTABILITY OF IDENTITY 77
stereotyping rationale of Price Waterhouse is heavily relied
upon. 82
The premier example of the Gender Nonconformity Ap-
proach is Smith v. City of Salem.83 In Smith, a transgender
woman claimed her employer discriminated against her because
she failed to comport with her employer's stereotypical beliefs
about masculinity.84 Ultimately, the court found her claim
should be framed as an instance of sex discrimination.85 The
court noted that previous cases where transgender plaintiffs
failed to prevail under Title VII were an example of courts im-
properly imposing the unprotected identity of "transsexual" on
the plaintiffs. 86 Furthermore, the court concluded that discrimi-
nation against transgender individuals for not conforming with
gender stereotypes is the same as discrimination against non-
transgender individuals who do not conform with gender
stereotypes.87
The second approach Lee describes is called the Per Se Ap-
proach.88 This approach recognizes that discrimination on the
basis of transgender identity is per se actionable under Title
VII.89 Discrimination resulting from an employee plans to tran-
sition, actual transition, or past transition is considered sex dis-
crimination under Title VII.90 The Per Se Approach is
illustrated by Schroer v. Billington.91 This case split the analysis
82 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (The court found
in favor of an employee who was discriminated against because she was too
"macho" and did not comport with stereotypes about how women should
dress and act. A plurality of justices found that Title VII barred discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender stereotyping in addition to discrimination on the
basis of biological sex. The court noted, "we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group.")
83 City of Salem, 378 F.3d at 572-75.
84 Id. at 574.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 575.
88 Lee, supra note 29, at 447.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306-308 (D.D.C. 2008).
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into two sections. First, the court recognized that a plaintiff's
status as "transgender" does not bar a gender stereotyping
claim92, and second, that discrimination on the basis of an indi-
vidual's gender-transition is actually discrimination because of
sex under Title VII.93 The court reasoned that transitioning
from one gender to another is similar to transitioning from one
religion to another for the purposes of a Title VII analysis.94
Discrimination on the basis of an individual's status as a "con-
vert" is literal discrimination under Title VII on the basis of re-
ligion, so discrimination against a transitioning individual is
literal discrimination on the basis of sex.95 The court also noted
that "[b]y definition, transsexuals are individuals who fail to
conform to stereotypes about how those assigned a particular
sex at birth should act, dress, and self-identify."9 6
Finally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the
EEOC) recently held that discrimination against transgender in-
dividuals should be prohibited as a form of sex discrimination
under Title VII.97 The EEOC found that discrimination against
an individual on the basis of their status as transgender is dis-
crimination against the individual on the basis of their sex.98
The EEOC ruling disagrees with the Per Se Approach of sepa-
rating literal sex discrimination from gender stereotyping dis-
crimination as two distinct types of Title VII claims.99 Instead,
the EEOC determined that these are just different formulations
of sex discrimination under Title VII. oo The court reasoned that
92 Id. at 304.
93 Id. at 306-08.
94 Id. at 306.
95 Id. at 306.
96 Id. at 307.
97 Macy v. Holder, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. 2012). See also Chris John-
son, Historic: EEOC ruling protects trans workers from discrimination, The
Washington Blade, (Aug. 20, 2013) http://www.washingtonblade.com/2012/04/
24/historic-eeoc-ruling-protects-trans-workers-from-discrimination/ (discuss-
ing Macy v. Holder, an EEOC case finding transgender individuals were pro-
tected under Title VII sex discrimination standards).
98 Macy, 2012 WL 1435995 at *5.
99 Id.
100 Id.
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"sex" for the purposes of Title VII refers to both biological sex
and the socially constructed concept of gender, and Title VII
prohibits discrimination on the basis of either.01 Therefore, the
EEOC concluded that when an employer discriminates against
an employee because the employee is transgender, the employer
is discriminating on the basis of sex.102
III. RE-CONCEPTUALIZING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
INCLUDING TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE
"REGARDED As" PRONG OF THE ADA
Despite developing jurisprudential and legislative efforts to
provide protections for marginalized individuals on the basis of
sex, gender, and disability, disabled and transgender individuals
continue to report a disproportionate amount of discrimination.
Some disability activists have argued that disability employment
has actually gone down since the passing of the ADA.103 De-
spite emerging Title VII protection in certain jurisdictions,
transgender individuals are four times more likely to live in ex-
treme poverty (less than $10K annual salary) than the general
population, with transgender respondents of color faring worse
across the board than white respondents.' 0 4 Whatever its ambi-
tions, the current anti-discrimination legal scheme is failing to
do gravely needed substantive work in ferreting out and prohib-
iting systematic oppression of transgender and disabled
individuals.
The "regarded as" prong conceives of identity in a fluid fash-
ion that is more aligned with the broadness and fluidity of the
actual experienced identities within the transgender community.
As discussed previously, many transgender individuals perceive
their gender identity in reference to an ever-shifting and fluid
101 Id.
102 Id. at *7.
103 See, Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act Re-
duced Employment for People with Disabilities?, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAP. L. 527, 533-34 (2004).
104 The National Transgender Discrimination Survey Report, Executive Sum-
mary, at http://endtransdiscrimination.org/PDFs/NTDSExecSummary.pdf.
[Vol. 3:180 DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GENDER & L.
social construct of identity.105 "Regarded as" disability under
the ADA fits in nicely with the lived-experiences of transgender
individuals because it recognizes how social forces construct the
identity of an individual. Furthermore, the "regarded as" prong
explains how society may perceive an individual's identity sepa-
rately from how that individual may experience their own iden-
tity. The "regarded as" prong expands the conception of
identity to include complex notions of intersectional social iden-
tity as seen through the perception of the employer; forcing a
confrontation with stereotyping and discriminatory views em-
ployers have about people they perceive to be "abnormal" or
"lesser than."
In order to show a "regarded as" disability, a transgender in-
dividual would most likely have to claim their employer per-
ceived them to have some form of mental impairment due to
their gender non-conformity. Under the ADA, physical or
mental impairment is defined as:
Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more body systems, such as neurological, musculo-
skeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (includ-
ing speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory,
hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
Any mental or psychological disorder, such as an
intellectual disability (formerly termed "mental
retardation"), or organic brain syndrome, emo-
tional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.106
The most obvious perceived mental impairment to argue as a
basis for inclusion under the ADA's "regarded as" prong is
GID. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 included an expan-
sion of mental health conditions that are "almost always" con-
sidered covered disabilities, including major depressive disorder,
10 See discussion infra at 8-15.
106 29 C.F.R. § 35.1630.2(h) (2011) (EEOC regulations governing title I).
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bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive com-
pulsive disorder or schizophrenia.,0 A parallel could be drawn
between these types of covered mental conditions and GID. In-
dividuals diagnosed with GID are more likely to suffer gender-
based discrimination, which in turn is a contributing risk factor
leading to increased suicidal ideation and attempt. 0 8 However,
this argument would have to made carefully, as depression is a
separate mental condition from GID. Those with GID do not
always experience symptoms of depression, and individuals who
report symptoms of depression in addition to their symptoms of
GID are more likely to suffer suicidal ideation. 109
Allowing transgender plaintiffs to make claims for being "re-
garded as" having GID would deal with the problems involved
in accessing a diagnosis. A transgender plaintiff bringing a "re-
garded as" claim would not need to show that an actual impair-
ment exists, and therefore would not need to show an actual
diagnosis with GID. What matters for a "regarded as" claim
would not be actual diagnosis with GID, but whether, from the
employer's point of view, it appeared as if the plaintiff had GID
or some other mental or physical disability. It's also possible to
see that a transgender plaintiff could amend a "regarded as"
claim based on the circumstances to allege myriad different im-
pairments the employer may have perceived. For example, the
gender-non-conforming physical appearance of a transgender
individual may cause an employer to perceive them as having
some form of physical impairment. This creates a broader, more
fluid concept of identity that would allow transgender individu-
als to bring varied, flexible claims without having to prove their
own adherence to the strict, medical model of transgender
identity.
107 Melanie Berkowitz, Defining Mental Health Issues Under the ADAAA,
at http://hiring.monster.com/hr/hr-best-practices/small-business/news/adaaa.
aspx.
108 Dr. Kristen Clements-Noelle et al., Attempted Suicide Among Trans-
gender Persons, 51 JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 53, 64 (2008) available at
http://www.tandfonline.com/doilabs/10.1300/JO82v5lnO3_04.
109 Id.
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In contrast, the concept of transgender identity under the
Gender Non-Conforming Approach of Title VII jurisprudence
is not as broad and flexible. As previously discussed, the Gen-
der Non-Conforming Approach under Title VII views discrimi-
nation against transgender individuals as a form of sex
discrimination.o10 Jason Lee points out that inherent in the no-
tion of sex discrimination is the acceptance of a set gender bi-
nary."' "The act of determining whether a plaintiff's expressive
gender deviates from his or her anchor gender forces a court to
wade through antiquated, clich6d, and/or stereotypical notions
of traditional gender roles in order to manufacture an 'anchor
gender' for comparative purposes.""12
However, the proposition that sex discrimination claims only
entrench restrictive, narrow gender norms is up for debate.113 In
fact, it could be argued that the Gender Nonconforming Ap-
proach to sex discrimination under Title VII is in reality nearly
synonymous with the "regarded as" prong of disability. In fol-
lowing the rationale of Price Waterhouse, "a court merely needs
to consider whether, from the point of view of an employer, an
employee failed to conform to the gender norms held by that
employer, and need not determine for itself whether a plaintiff is
in truth gender nonconforming.",14 Similarly, the "regarded as"
prong focuses on how the employer perceives the identity of an
individual, and how the employer treats that individual based
upon the perception of that identity. In both approaches, the
court focuses on the perception of the employer, not on any im-
mutable characteristic of the employee.
Another concern Lee raises with transgender identity as con-
ceived in the Per Se Approach of Title VII jurisprudence is that
it makes certain subtle forms of second generation discrimina-
tion hard to combat.115 Second generation discrimination uses
110 See discussion infra, 5-6.
iI Lee, supra note 29, at 444.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 445.
114 Id. (emphasis added.)
115 Id. at 451-52.
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coded traits as proxies for sex distinctions that have been pro-
hibited under Title VII (e.g. requiring waitresses to be "kinder"
or more "soft" when interacting with customers, instead of re-
quiring them to be "more feminine").116 Recall that under the
Per Se Approach sex discrimination against transgender individ-
uals are viewed as the same kind of sex discrimination faced by
cis-gender individuals. 117 Certain distinctions based on gender-
coded traits are permissible in some employment contexts, and
under the Per Se Approach, a plaintiff is generally not able to
prove the employer was motivated by animus toward their trans-
gender status.1 1 8
In any case, though the "regarded as" prong may establish a
more fluid concept of identity, in application, a "regarded as"
plaintiff can only make somewhat narrow claims of disparate
treatment.119 What precisely a plaintiff must establish to show
that they are "regarded as" having a disability under the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 remains unclear. Some scholars have
argued that in order to determine whether a plaintiff is "re-
garded as" having an impairment courts should look primarily
to how the plaintiff was treated rather than trying to determine
the subjective perception of the defendant directly.120 The prob-
lem with any attempt to discover the perception of the employer
is in determining what evidence can be used to prove that per-
ception. How can a transgender plaintiff prove that the em-
116 Id. at 452.
117 See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011), noting
that sex discrimination against transgender individuals and non-transgender
individuals differs "in degree but not in kind." See also, infra pages 5-6.
118 Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orien-
tation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE
L.J. 1, 12-13 (1995). See also, Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1994-1995). Krieger argues that in
cases where there are more coded, subtle forms of discrimination, employers
discriminate not with animus but from an origin of unconscious, cognitive
bias.
119 Weber, supra note 26, at 74.
120 Stephen F. Befort, Let's Try This Again: The ADA Amendment Act of
2008 Attempts to Reinvigorate the "Regarded As" Prong of the Statutory Defi-
nition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993, 1018 (2010).
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ployer perceived them as having a physical or mental
impairment? It is difficult for courts to come up with a consis-
tent test to prove a perceived impairment in the "theoretical
mind" of the employer.121
Under the current ADA Amendments Act "regarded as"
prong definition, what allows a court to determine if the plaintiff
is "disabled" is not whether the employer actually subjectively
perceived the plaintiff to have an impairment, but whether the
employer treated the plaintiff as if he or she did. Because a "re-
garded as" plaintiff has to show an adverse action taken by the
employer on the basis of the perceived identity,122 courts deter-
mine whether an employee was perceived to have an impair-
ment by looking directly at the alleged discriminatory conduct.
This collapses the definition of "regarded as" into an inquiry
about the affirmative, adverse conduct of the employer and
whether that conduct was on the basis of a perceived disability,
and results in "regarded as" plaintiffs only being able to bring
claims under disparate treatment analysis.12 3
Emerging law under Title VII has already allowed trans-
gender plaintiffs to begin bringing claims of sex discrimination
121 Bradley A. Arehart, Disability Trouble, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 347,
378 (2011).
122 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)
123 To make a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must prove discrimina-
tory intent on the part of the employer. This is either accomplished through
direct evidence or through proof-of-intent-by-inference. Proof-of-intent-by-
inference as articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green is much more
difficult to prove. Under that standard, a plaintiff must show (1) that the
plaintiff has a protected status under Title VII or the ADA, (2) the plaintiff
was meeting the legitimate employment expectations of her employer, (3) the
plaintiff experienced adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated
employees received more favorable treatment. Disparate treatment claims
have a heavier burden on a plaintiff than reasonable accommodation claims
in that they require the plaintiff to prove, either directly or indirectly, that the
employer intended to discriminate on the basis of their disability. Reasona-
ble accommodation claims have no requirement that the plaintiff show there
was active intent to discriminate on the basis of disability. For a full discus-
sion of disparate treatment claims under the ADA, see Weber, supra note 13,
at 54-63.
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under a disparate treatment scheme.124 As a result, allowing
transgender individuals to bring claims under the "regarded as"
prong of the ADA would not be too extreme in providing com-
pletely unheard of or un-established protections. Because of
this, it should be fairly easy for courts to incorporate trans-
gender individuals "regarded as" having a disability under the
ADA's disparate treatment analysis. While it would not create
any groundbreaking doctrinal rationale, at the very least al-
lowing transgender individuals to make claims under the "re-
garded as" prong of disability would allow more transgender
individuals to seek varied types of protection under both Title
VII and the ADA.
CONCLUSION
The ADA's "regarded as" prong of disability provides a more
fluid concept of identity that focuses on the employer's percep-
tion of the individual instead of on narrow, immutable charac-
teristics within the individual. While this may create a broader,
flexible category that fits more harmoniously within transgender
rights ideals about the fluidity of gender-identity, ultimately,
even allowing transgender individuals to make claims under the
"regarded as" prong would be insufficient in providing protec-
tion for transgender individuals. The "regarded as" prong
would only allow trans* individuals to bring claims on the basis
of disparate treatment, and there are already areas emerging
under Title VII sex discrimination that allow transgender plain-
tiffs to bring such claims. As such, courts should not be hesitant
to allow transgender plaintiffs to bring claims under the "re-
garded as" prong of the ADA.
Maria Pahl*
124 See discussion infra 4-7.
* 2013 J.D. Graduate, DePaul University College of Law; B.A. 2009, Univer-
sity of Michigan. I would like to thank Professor Sumi Cho and Owen
Daniel-McCarter, the former for help and encouragement with the article,
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